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Abstract: Human control of action in routine situations involves a flexible interplay 
between (a) task dependent serial ordering constraints, (b) top-down, or intentional, 
control processes and (c) bottom-up, or environmentally-triggered, affordances. 
Additionally, the interaction between these influences is modulated by learning 
mechanisms that, over time, appear to reduce the need for top-down control processes 
while still allowing those processes to intervene at any point if necessary or if desired. 
We present a model of the acquisition and control of goal-directed action that goes 
beyond existing models by operationalizing an interface between two putative systems – 
a routine and a non-routine system – thereby demonstrating how explicitly represented 
goals can interact with the emergent task representations that develop through learning in 
the routine system. The gradual emergence of task representations offers an explanation 
for the transfer of control with experience from the non-routine goal-based system to the 
routine system. At the same time it allows action selection to be sensitive both to 
environmental triggers and to biasing from multiple levels within the goal system.  
 
Keywords: routine sequential action, control of action, habits, goal-directed action, 
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Introduction 
Eight characteristics of the control of sequential action 
The execution and control of routine sequential action is a core component of everyday 
human activities. In highly over-learned tasks the control system (or systems) responsible is 
capable of functioning with only occasional errors (Reason, 1979), even when simultaneously 
carrying out other, apparently cognitively demanding, tasks. For example, it is usually 
possible to conduct an engaging conversation while completing a routine task such as 
preparing a mug of coffee. More specifically, the control of sequential action in humans can 
be characterized by the following eight properties. 
1. Sequential Action is Purposive (i.e., Goal-Directed). Consider an action sequence such as: 
‹‹open sugar bowl, pick up spoon, dip spoon in sugar bowl, empty spoon into beverage, stir 
beverage, discard spoon››. This sequence will achieve the goal of sweetening a beverage 
(amongst other things), and if an agent’s goal was to sweeten a beverage then a plausible 
approach would be for the agent to attempt to perform this (or some closely related) sequence 
of actions. 
2. Action is Hierarchically Structured. The sequence of actions involved in everyday tasks, 
such as preparing a cup of tea, may be decomposed into a sequence of subsequences, where 
the subsequences cohere because they achieve subgoals of the original task (such as boiling 
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the water or sweetening the tea) and because they may be used in different tasks (such as 
preparing a mug of instant coffee). Transitions from one subsequence into the next are, 
conversely, less coherent and more susceptible to error (e.g., Reason, 1979; Botvinick & 
Bylsma, 2005), presumably because other tasks might require different transitions. Action 
thus has a hierarchical structure, and this structure reflects the goal/subgoal structure of the 
action sequence’s highest-level goal.  
3. Actions within a Sequence are not all Equal. While action sequences are hierarchically 
structured, there is some flexibility in that structure. This flexibility relates to the different 
functions that actions serve within a sequence. In particular, “enabling” actions (e.g., picking 
up a spoon to stir a beverage) and “clean-up” actions (e.g., discarding the spoon once the 
beverage has been stirred) may be omitted in any specific instance if they are redundant 
(Schwartz et al., 1991). Thus, sweetening a beverage with two sugars does not involve 
performing the beverage sweetening sequence in its entirety twice. Rather, the two sequences 
are normally run together (without discarding the spoon and picking it up again between the 
two subsequences) and this running together occurs with little or no apparent cognitive cost or 
load. 
4. Action may be Controlled at Multiple Levels. Consider an everyday task such as dressing or 
grooming. Phenomenologically, one might perform such a task as a series of subtasks (e.g., 
fetching a pair of socks, and then putting a sock on each foot). Alternatively, one may 
deliberately perform the sub-ordinate acts within each subtask (walking to the sock drawer, 
opening the drawer, etc.). In the case of well-learned actions, it may even be possible to 
perform the super-ordinate task without deliberately attending to the individual subtasks 
(Norman, 1981). Consider the situation when entering a computer password. 
Phenomenologically, it is possible to do this without focusing on the individual characters. 
However, if errors are made on the original attempt through, for example, excess haste, and 
one needs to renter the password correctly or risk being locked out of ones account, then it is 
possible to exert control at the level of individual actions. Thus, and as argued by Heckhausen 
and Beckmann (1990, p. 36) when considering purposive action, “the action-guiding intention 
can be identified at various goal levels”. 
5. Action may be Triggered by Features of the Environment. As reviewed by Riddoch, 
Edwards, Humphreys, West and Heafield (1998), a substantial body of evidence from 
behavioral and neuropsychological studies strongly supports the view that actions may be 
primed or triggered by features of the environment. For example, in diary studies of slips and 
lapses in everyday action, Reason (1979, 1984) and Norman (1981) found numerous reports 
of action errors in which an unintended but environmentally appropriate action was 
performed. Such errors are more common (and more flagrant) in neuropsychological 
disorders of action selection, such as utilization behavior (where patients are prone to 
spontaneously use objects present in their immediate environment in object-appropriate ways: 
Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice, Burgess, Shon & Baxter, 1989), anarchic hand syndrome (where 
one of a patient’s hands acts independently of, and often in conflict with, the patient’s stated 
intentions: see, e.g., Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1991; Goldberg, Mayer, & Toglia, 
1981) and action disorganization syndrome (where the integrity of goal-directed action is 
compromised, with action sequences including frequent omission, action addition, and object 
substitution errors: Schwartz et al., 1991, 1998; see also Luria, 1966; Duncan, 1986).  
6. Routine Action Requires Minimal Attentional Control. One key finding from the diary 
studies of Reason (1979, 1984) and Norman (1981) is that action in routine situations is prone 
to error when attention is diverted by some other task (see also Heckhausen & Beckmann, 
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1990). Viewing this finding from an alternative perspective, it is clear that while action slips 
and lapses may be relatively common when attention is not directed to a routine task, they are 
by no means universal.1 Thus, in many situations it is possible to perform routine action 
sequences without overt attention and without error (James, 1890; Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
For example, it is generally possible to listen to the morning news while making coffee 
without error, or to put on socks and shoes while having a conversation.  
7. Learning Reduces the Need for Attentional Control. An obvious implication of the previous 
property together with the fact that attentional control is required for non-routine action (or 
action in non-routine situations) is that the need for attentional control is reduced by learning 
or practice. That is, a consequence of repeated performance of an action sequence in a specific 
situation is that the action sequence comes to be automatized. If we accept that prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) is involved in the attentional control of goal-directed behavior (e.g. Miller & 
Cohen, 2001), then the decreasing need for attention with practice is consistent with 
neuroimaging studies (e.g., Jenkins, Brooks, Nixon, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 1994; 
Jueptner et al., 1997; Passingham, Rowe & Sakai, 2005) which show activation of regions of 
the PFC to be greater during the early stages of acquisition of a task, and lesion studies (e.g., 
Beldarrain, Grafman, Pascual-Leone, & Garcia-Monco, 1999; Richer, Chouinard, & Rouleau, 
1999) which show that procedural and motor learning are impaired by frontal lesions. 
8. Attentional Control may Initiate and/or Override Learned Action Sequences. The final 
property of action control with which we are concerned is that while well-learned action 
sequences may be performed in routine situations with minimal attentional control, such 
control may nevertheless be used to override a learned sequence when necessary (e.g., when 
recovering from error) or desired (e.g., when trying to break a habit: Wood & Neal, 2007). 
The “Dual Systems” theory of the control of sequential action 
One widely accepted view of the control of sequential behavior which provides contact with 
these eight properties is Norman and Shallice’s (1986) “Dual Systems” theory. Within this 
theory, sequential action is controlled by Contention Scheduling (CS), a conflict resolution 
system that requires minimal cognitive resources. This system is held to select from amongst 
the myriad of actions possible at any moment in time, and be capable of functioning 
autonomously during the control of routine behavior. Importantly, CS is held to trade-off 
between two distinct influences: bottom-up environmental triggers, sometimes termed 
‘exogenous control’ on the one hand, and task-specific ordering constraints (so-called 
‘horizontal threads’) on the other hand. However, in non-routine or deliberative behavior 
(e.g., less familiar circumstances, novel tasks or dangerous situations), a third influence might 
come into play: an executive system, the Supervisory System (SS), may modulate CS via top-
down control (so-called ‘vertical threads’). The relationship between these two systems (CS 
and SS) may be likened to the relationship between a horse and a rider: 
a. the horse is the one who actually carries out the work (of locomotion), and it takes 
environmental constraints into account when doing this, e.g., not walking into 
obstacles 
b. the rider may bias the horse at problematic points, e.g., in choosing to go left or 
right at a crossing 
                                                
1 We are concerned here with attention in the sense of “attention to action”, following Norman and Shallice 
(1986; see also Humphreys & Riddoch, 2005), and not “visual attention”. Attention to action corresponds 
phenomenologically to cognitive effort when selecting actions. 
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c. the rider is not necessarily more intelligent than the horse (and is thus not a 
homunculus) – he would not know which leg to move when – but he might be 
better at deciding upon an appropriate path, especially in unfamiliar or ambiguous 
circumstances 
d. in familiar situations the horse can do well without any influence from the rider 
(e.g., the horse is able to find its way home on its own along a familiar route) 
As the horse and rider analogy makes clear, while the theory posits two different systems that 
contribute to the control of action, it is not claimed that action is controlled by switching 
between one system and the other. Rather, action selection is the product of CS (i.e., the 
horse) acting under occasional or sporadic bias from SS (i.e., the rider). In routine situations, 
CS may function appropriately in the absence of input from SS (although redundant input 
from SS should not pose a problem), while in non-routine situations input from SS is required 
to modulate routine CS functioning in order to produce appropriate or desired behavior. 
At an informal level, the Dual Systems view is consistent with each of the properties 
described above (see, e.g., Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shallice, 1988). It is also consistent 
with work in the animal psychology literature, which argues that habits and goal-directed 
actions are affected differentially by reward (e.g., Dickinson, 1985; see also Dickinson & 
Balleine, 2002). Shallice (2006) provides a further argument for distinct systems for the 
control of routine and non-routine action, namely that the systems are sensitive to different 
variables. In the case of routine action, Shallice argues that the key variables affecting 
performance are those of familiarity, age-of-acquisition, and frequency of application. These 
variables, Shallice notes, are ones typically linked with associationist (or, in contemporary 
computational terms, connectionist) theories. Non-routine behavior, or deliberative control, 
does not appear to be affected by these variables. 
If we are to take the implications of the Dual Systems theory seriously, a clear account of the 
interplay between CS and SS – the harness or reins, if you like, used by the rider to control 
the horse – is needed to help understand how sequential action is governed. These two 
systems need to be able to interact in a flexible way in order to satisfy the properties 
enumerated above. Thus, SS must be able to support CS efficiently when required at 
problematic points in a sequence, while, at the same time, CS must strive for independence so 
as to be able to work autonomously in sufficiently well-learned situations. Of course, deciding 
what makes a specific choice ‘sufficiently well-learned’ is a significant challenge – firstly, 
because the amount of experience with a specific sequence and the choices to be made during 
its execution will change over time, and secondly, because the level of selection difficulty at 
any one point in a sequence might furthermore depend on factors such as the number of, and 
familiarity with, other locally similar sequences, the number of alternative ways of achieving 
the current goal, the temporal distance between co-dependent actions, and the presence or 
absence of perceptual disambiguation cues in the environment. Empirical work has shown 
that all of these factors can exert an influence on the time between selection of actions within 
a semi-routine goal-directed sequence (Ruh et al., 2010). 
Existing Models of the Control of Sequential Action 
To date, there are three main computational accounts of routine sequential action selection 
within the psychological literature. One key difference between the accounts concerns their 
underlying task representation. One, the simple recurrent network (SRN) model of Botvinick 
and Plaut (2004), employs emergent, distributed representations in conjunction with a 
(temporal) context layer to control task execution. The second, the interactive activation 
Cooper, Ruh & Mareschal 
 
The Goal Circuit Model 
5 
network (IAN) model of Cooper and Shallice (2000) relies on explicit, hierarchically 
structured task representations or schemas, where subgoals mediate schema-subschema 
associations. The third, the “memory for goals” (MfG) model of Trafton et al. (2011; see also 
Altmann & Trafton, 2002), assumes that action is guided by what they call episodic control 
codes that are subject to decay but may be primed by context. These control codes may be 
hierarchically structured, reflecting task structure. The SRN model, due to its 
associationist/connectionist origins, is sensitive to precisely the variables identified by 
Shallice (2006) as affecting routine behavior. For example, the errors made by the model are 
determined by the sequences on which it was trained (i.e., familiarity). The IAN and MfG 
models, conversely, capture more of the goal-directed nature of sequential action and allow 
for the inclusion of, for example, monitoring and error correction mechanisms. (See Ruh, 
2007, for a more detailed comparison and criticism of the SRN and IAN approaches.) The 
most important shortcoming of all models, however, is that they are models of CS only.2 
Therefore, they are unable to make any claims about behavior that is not entirely routinized, 
or indeed about the acquisition of routine tasks which, following our list of characteristic 
properties of human sequential action, involves a progressive transfer of control from higher 
level systems (SS) to lower level (CS) ones. 
Two further existing models address this issue in different ways. Daw, Niv and Dayan (2005) 
present a mathematical account of sequential behavioral control based on two systems – one 
(corresponding in functionality to SS) is held to implement “tree-search” control and be 
associated with prefrontal cortex, while the other (corresponding in functionality to CS) is 
held to implement “cached” control and be associated with the dorsolateral striatum. Each 
system is held to learn through a form of Reinforcement Learning (RL: Sutton & Barto, 
1998), but the prefrontal system is held to use RL to acquire a model of the environment 
which may be used for planning and prediction (so-called “model-based” RL) while the 
striatal system is held to use simpler “model-free” RL algorithms, which associate rewards 
with sequences of actions. Daw et al. argue that competition between these two systems is 
resolved an uncertainty-based controller that seeks to select the system whose output is 
expected to be most accurate. While this account has many strengths, the idea of uncertainty-
based selection between the outputs of the two systems (rather than that one system – 
presumably the frontal system – might operate indirectly by biasing the other system) does 
not easily account for some key characteristics of sequential action, such as that action may be 
controlled at multiple levels (characteristic 4), and that attentional control may initiate and/or 
override learned action sequences (characteristic 8). 
A second line of work where this transfer has been explored is in the context of skill 
acquisition. The model of skill acquisition of Taatgen et al. (2008), in particular, attempts to 
balance what the authors refer to as “top-down control” and “bottom-up control” so as to 
acquire skill knowledge that is both robust (e.g., to interruptions) and flexible (i.e., that 
generalize to related problems). These are clearly critical features of both acquired skills and 
everyday action. (See Cooper et al., 2005, for a development of the IAN model of CS that 
addresses these requirements.) Not withstanding subtle differences between the domains of 
cognitive skills and routine action, the current work shares goals with that of Taatgen et al. 
However, in contrast to those authors, whose model is developed within the ACT-R 
                                                
2 Botvinick and Plaut (2004) do not describe their SRN model in terms of the dual-ssystems model discussed 
here. However, they do consider the model to be one of routine sequential action, and not one of action more 
generally. That their model is intended specifically to be one of CS is clarified in their later work, where they 
relate their model to a so-called habit system, and “concur with Cooper and Shallice [2006] on the distinction 
between two interacting systems underlying action control, a habit (or Contention Scheduling) system and a 
goal-directed (or Supervisory Attentional) system” (Botvinick & Plaut, 2006, p. 923). 
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architecture, the model proposed below builds on the Parallel Distributed Processing approach 
to cognitive modeling. Specifically, our model attempts to combine the strengths of the SRN 
and IAN approaches (and representational formats), thereby allowing us to address the full 
range of influences proposed within the Dual Systems framework. We begin by describing 
our model, the Goal Circuit (GC) model, initially in abstract terms and then as applied in a 
concrete domain – that of beverage preparation. Three simulation studies are then presented 
which demonstrate how the model captures the characteristics of action enumerated above. 
Specifically, it is demonstrated that the GC model can replicate critical aspects of 
performance of the SRN model, while at the same time it is robust to noise and instructable 
through its goal-node interface – a key property of the IAN model. The general discussion 
then focuses on insights from the model and its relation to the wider literature.  
The Goal Circuit Model: Assumptions and Architecture 
Learning routine sequential action in a way that allows the flexible application of control 
when it is, and is not, necessary, remains a significant difficulty. Part of that difficulty lies in 
the fact that the influence of SS required by CS to function without error should decrease as 
CS gains experience on a task. This requirement conflicts with associationist approaches to 
learning where, if SS input were present and appropriate, learning would strengthen 
connections between SS and CS, thereby making CS more rather than less reliant on SS. This 
and the following section therefore present a dual-system model of action control in which the 
routine system gradually becomes capable of autonomous routine behavior. At the same time, 
the routine system can be biased by the non-routine system to produce non-routine behavior if 
necessary. We refer to the model as the Goal Circuit (GC) model. It extends Botvinick and 
Plaut’s SRN model in three ways. Specifically, it provides: 
a. a way to interface the model with an ‘executive system’ (SS) which can add top-
down control (bias) in cases when action is not fully routinized; 
b. a more plausible training regime, taking into account reusability of existing 
(sub)sequence knowledge and progressive reduction of executive control with 
increasing practice; and 
c. the ability to reach the (sub)goal of a specific (sub)task in a flexible manner, thus 
dealing with minor variations in the states of objects (e.g., when preparing a 
beverage whether condiment packets are closed or already open) or the initial 
state of the system. 
Figure 1: The abstract architecture of the GC model and the contributions of different 
routes to action selection within it: a) direct pathway; b) context pathway; c) goal circuit.  
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The Abstract Architecture 
The abstract architecture of the GC model is illustrated in Figure 1. As in the original SRN of 
Botvinick and Plaut (2004), our model takes inputs representing the object on which the 
model is currently “fixated” and the object (if any) which is currently “held” by the model. 
Unlike the original SRN, the GC model also takes as input a representation of the current 
goal(s). The GC model aims to generate from these inputs an action and a representation of 
the subsequent or predicted goal(s). Actions may include moving fixation to another object, 
picking up the fixated object, or manipulating the held object in one of several ways 
(including putting it down). Representations of goals are fed back into the model on the next 
processing step, possibly modulated by an SS component. Input units feed through a hidden 
layer with recurrent connections which allow the model to develop an implicit representation 
of task context through learning. This context, in conjunction with the input at any step in a 
task, allows the model, once trained, to correctly generate the appropriate output and the 
context for the next step.  
We take the Botvinick and Plaut model as our starting point because an SRN provides a 
natural implementation of both learning and sequence execution, and, as noted above, the 
variables to which routine action selection are sensitive (recency, frequency, etc.) are most 
easily captured by associationist learning principles (Shallice, 2006). However, in adopting a 
recurrent architecture we do not subscribe to the specific learning regime employed by 
Botvinick and Plaut (2004), or to the implicit, non-hierarchical (and hence non-compositional) 
and non-teleological schema representations that result from this regime (see Cooper & 
Shallice, 2006). Rather, two substantive augmentations and modifications to the basic SRN 
yield schema representations that implicitly encode hierarchy and purpose. First, an additional 
input to the model is provided by a bank of goal units. Second, and as a consequence, an 
additional route exist between perception and action, mediated by goals and paralleling the 
involvement of goals in Cooper and Shallice’s IAN model.  
Assumption 1: Multiple Routes in the Selection of Action 
The GC model assumes that the selection of each individual action is the product of multiple 
influences or biases. Three specific influences are implemented. First, following characteristic 
5, it is assumed that one input to the action selection mechanism is the representation of the 
current external environment (see Figure 1a). This route reflects Gibson’s notion of direct 
affordances of objects for actions (Gibson, 1977). A second source of influence is, as 
described above, a sequencing system for the generation and regulation of well-learned or 
routine action sequences (CS; see Figure 1b). Finally, the hypothesized SS provides a third 
source of bias (see Figure 1c). This allows specific intentions to affect behavior (characteristic 
8), including predicted goals produced by processing of the network on the previous 
processing step. We view the three sources of bias as different routes from perception to 
action. Importantly, the routes are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are held to operate in 
conjunction in the functioning model. Action selection at any moment therefore reflects the 
superposition of the influences of the various routes. Note that the three routes correspond 
approximately to the three different influences (bottom-up environmental triggers, horizontal 
ordering constraints and top-down control) that the Dual Systems framework posits to interact 
within Contention Scheduling.  
Assumption 2: Goal Units and Goal-Based Learning 
The second assumption of the GC model (following properties 1, 2 and 3) is that goals are 
encoded at multiple levels within the action selection system(s) and these encodings may bias 
action selection at any point. For current purposes, goals are encoded using a localist 
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representation (e.g., one node represents the goal of making coffee, while another represents 
the sub-goal of adding sugar, etc.). The assumption is that these nodes may be indirectly 
activated by an (external) executive system, or directly activated through the automatic 
feedback of predicted goals (dotted lines in Figure 1 from predicted goals via SS to goal units; 
see below for more detail).  
The inclusion of goal units allows for what we consider to be a more psychologically 
plausible approach to learning. Thus, within the GC model learning is goal-based rather than 
sequence-based. The original SRN model of Botvinick and Plaut (2004) was trained on six 
specific sequences corresponding to two tasks (four sequences for preparing a mug of instant 
coffee, and two for preparing a mug of tea), and was able to reproduce these six sequences. 
Learning in the GC model instead involves encoding sequences that achieve task goals and 
sub-goals. Thus, for each goal / sub-goal of a task, the model is trained to achieve the goal / 
sub-goal from any given state of the environment. While both models use the same 
underlying learning algorithm (back-propagation through time), it will be shown the emphasis 
on goal-based sequence learning within the GC model results in a system that is both robust 
and flexible. 
A corollary of the incorporation of goal units and goal-based learning is that if a network has 
already learned action subsequences (such as how to add coffee grounds, sugar, cream, etc. 
when making a beverage) then it should be possible to guide the model to complete more 
complex or novel sequences (e.g., making a cup of coffee) made up of the individual 
subsequences by activating goal units associated with each subsequence in the correct order. 
At the same time sufficient experience of the transitions between subsequences required for a 
complex sequence should result in knowledge of subsequence ordering becoming associated 
with higher-level goal units, thus making the top-down guidance at the lower level optional. 
The same argument applies to the lower-level goals (e.g., acquisition of an “add sugar to 
beverage” routine), down to basic schemas (e.g., pick something up), where ordering is fully 
determined by environmental constraints.  
Comparison with the SRN Model of Botvinick and Plaut (2004) 
To summarize, while the GC architecture builds upon Botvinick and Plaut’s SRN 
architecture, it differs in the two critical ways. First, the network is augmented with a “goal 
circuit”, which contains explicitly represented goals that are predicted from and fed back into 
the shared hidden layer, mediated through the hypothesized SS. The goal input bank 
corresponds to the interface with SS. Units here are used to exert top-down control over the 
basic CS system (i.e., the core SRN of Botvinick & Plaut, 2004). Second, the network is 
trained not with specific sequences but with specific goals, and moreover it is trained with 
goals at all levels of the hierarchy. That is, the network is trained not merely to make coffee 
by following a rote sequence, but also to add sugar to a beverage, and to get sugar, open it, 
etc. This offers the possibility of applying relevant subsequence in novel tasks or novel 
environments. 
The Beverage Preparation Task 
In order to fully specify the abstract GC model it is necessary to commit to a particular task 
and a specific input/output representation. Two of the previous computational accounts of 
routine sequential action described above (i.e., Cooper & Shallice, 2000; Botvinick & Plaut, 
2004) have been expressed as models of behavior on the routine task of preparing a cup of tea 
or instant coffee. This task, which has been the subject of several empirical studies (e.g., 
Giovannetti, Schwartz & Buxbaum, 2007; Humphreys & Forde, 1998; Humphreys, Forde & 
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Francis, 2000; Reason, 1990; Ruh et al., 2010; Schwartz et al., 1998; Schwartz, Reed, 
Montgomery, Palmer, & Mayer, 1991; Land, Mennie & Rusted, 1999), captures several 
challenging aspects of hierarchical sequential tasks, such as having the same subsequence 
appear in different tasks (e.g., sugar may be added to either tea or coffee) and/or in different 
orders (e.g., cream may be added before or after sugar when making coffee), and with 
different versions of subsequences (e.g., using sugar from a pack or from a bowl) being 
interchangeable. For these reasons it is the task that we adopt here. More precisely, we 
simulate the acquisition of beverage preparation as described by Botvinick and Plaut (2004), 
though we characterize the domain is in terms of its goal/subgoal structure. Thus, we assume 
18 goals at three levels which decompose (eventually) into 19 actions (see Table 1): 
• 2 high-level goals: make tea, make coffee 
• 5 mid-level goals: add grounds, add teabag, add sugar, add cream, drink 
• 11 low-level goals: get object (for each of seven objects), open, add, stir, sip 
Again, following Botvinick and Plaut (2004), there is one way to make tea, and two ways of 
making coffee (depending on the ordering of the creaming and sugaring subtasks): 
Make tea ← add teabag, add sugar, drink 
Make coffee ← add grounds, add sugar, add cream, drink 
Make coffee ← add grounds, add cream, add sugar, drink 
The five mid-level goals similarly decompose into sequences of low-level goals: 
Add grounds ← get-coffee-pack, open, add, stir 
Add teabag ← get-teabag, dip 
Add sugar ← get-sugar, [open,] add, stir 
Add cream ← get-cream-carton, open, add, stir 
Drink ← get-mug, sip, sip 
As noted above, the model takes as input a representation of a held object and a representation 
of a fixated object, from which it generates an action such as put down (the held object) or 
pick up (the fixated object). The decomposition of low-level goals into basic actions depends 
upon the fixated and held objects, so that a low-level goal such as get-cream-carton might be 
achieved by anything between zero and three actions. If the cream carton is already held, then 
no actions are required, but if some other object is being held and the cream carton is not 
fixated, then three actions will be necessary: put-down (whatever is being held), fixate-cream-
carton, and pick-up (whatever is being fixated, i.e., the cream carton). 
For simulations 1 and 2 below it is assumed that at the beginning of the task the state of the 
world is such that nothing is fixated, nothing is held, and all containers are sealed. In this 
situation most low-level goals correspond to a fixed sequence of basic actions. The only 
exceptions relate to sub-goals of add sugar. Following Botvinick and Plaut (2004), two sugar 
sources are included in the environment, and the consequence of performing get-sugar depend 
upon which happens to be returned by the fixate-sugar action. If this action results in the 
(sealed) sugar packet being the fixated object, then the appropriate subsequent actions are to 
tear the packet open and add its contents to the mug. (This involves fixating upon the mug and 
pouring the content of the held object into the mug.) If, however, fixate-sugar results in the 
sugar-bowl being the fixated object, then get-sugar must also open the sugar-bowl by pulling-
off its lid and putting it down, get the teaspoon, and scoop from the sugar-bowl with the 
teaspoon. 
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Simulation 3 considers the more general situation where the initial state of the world varies 
from trial to trial and so where containers may or may not be open. As should be clear from 
this discussion, the characterization of the domain in terms of goals and subgoals allows for 
subgoals which may in some situations be unnecessary and hence which in some situations 
should be omitted. 
Network Architecture for the Beverage Preparation Task 
In order to model beverage preparation, the details of the GC model’s architecture and 
parameters were held as close as possible to those of the original SRN model of Botvinick and 
Plaut (2004). Thus, a standard sigmoidal activation function (ranging from 0 to 1) was 
employed for all units of the network. The perceptual input consisted of 37 units coding the 
objects currently fixated (18 units) and held (19 units), while the output layer coded Botvinick 
and Plaut’s (2004) 19 possible actions in a localist manner. (See Table 1 for details.) The goal 
layers (for both input goals and predicted goals) consisted of 18 units encoding the goals 
described above. The hidden layer had 50 units. 
Simulation Studies 
Simulation 1: Learning with Variable Direction from Goal Units 
Before attempting to explore the intentional control of behavior within the GC model or the 
ability of the model to transfer learned behavior to novel situations, it is essential to 
demonstrate that the basic model is indeed capable of learning tasks of similar complexity to 
those employed in earlier work, and moreover that when trained the model is capable of 
Input unit Object fixated or held  Output unit Action 
1 cup  1 pick-up 
2 1-handle  2 put-down 
3 2-handles  3 pour 
4 lid  4 peel-open 
5 clear-liquid  5 tear-open 
6 light  6 pull-open 
7 brown-liquid  7 pull-off 
8 carton  8 scoop 
9 open  9 sip 
10 closed  10 stir 
11 packet  11 dip 
12 foil  12 say-done 
13 paper  13 fixate-cup 
14 torn  14 fixate-teabag 
15 untorn  15 fixate-coffee-pack 
16 spoon  16 fixate-spoon 
17 teabag  17 fixate-carton 
18 sugar  18 fixate-sugar 
19 nothing  19 fixate-sugar-bowl 
Table 1: Details of the model’s input and output representations: Following Botvinick and 
Plaut (2004), we use 18 units to encode fixated objects and 19 to encode held objects, with 
the 19th held unit encoding that nothing is held. Individual objects are coded by up to five 
units, for example activating nodes 1, 2 and 5 represents a cup filled with water. 
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exploiting the goal circuit so as to function with different levels of guidance from goal input 
units, reflecting the fact that, once routinized, sequential action may be performed with or 
without over attention (characteristics 4, 6 and 7, from the introduction). This was the purpose 
of simulation 1.  
Method 
As discussed above, simple recurrent network models are typically trained with a closed set of 
target sequences, constructed prior to training and subject to the requirements of the specific 
task. In contrast, for the GC model target behaviors are defined in terms of goals as described 
above. Target action sequences are then constructed on the fly (i.e., during a trial and 
following each action) in the context of the changing state of a simulated world. To illustrate, 
suppose the target goal is to add sugar to a container. As discussed above, the sequence 
needed to achieve this goal will depend upon what forms of sugar are available in the 
immediate environment (e.g., a sugar packet versus a sugar bowl), and whether they are open 
or closed. Even if the initial state of the world is fixed, different sequences may be generated 
for different attempts at the same goal if individual steps are non-deterministic, as is the case 
in the current domain, where (as described above and following Botvinick & Plaut, 2004) the 
fixate-sugar action can result in fixation upon either the sugar packet or the sugar bowl. Given 
this approach, one training epoch was defined as one attempt at each of the 18 goals (the 11 
low-level goals, the 5 mid-level goals, and the 2 high-level goals), with one sequence for each 
goal generated on the fly during each training trial from the changing representation of the 
state of the environment. 
The model was trained using epoch-wise back-propagation through time with a cross-entropy 
error function (Williams & Zipser, 1995) and with a learning rate of 0.001, weight persistence 
of 0.999999, and weight updates applied after each item. Informal exploration suggested that 
with these settings training generally required 10,000 to 20,000 epochs, but that even then the 
model sometimes failed to learn the most complex sequences (those for making coffee). To 
explore training effects systematically, model behavior was therefore examined with four 
level of training: after 5,000 epochs, 10,000 epochs, 20,000 epochs and 40,000 epochs. In 
order to allow the network to incorporate optional dependence on the goal circuit, goal inputs 
were set to zero following the first step on half of the training epochs. On the other half, goal 
inputs were set to values corresponding to the current goal and subgoals, i.e., the values that a 
fully trained network should have generated as the predicted goal activations on the previous 
cycle. 
For each training level, model weights were initially randomized to values uniformly 
distributed between –0.15 and +0.15 and the model was trained on the full goal-set for the 
specified number of epochs. The trained model was then tested one hundred times on each of 
the eighteen goals. Each test involved setting the values of all hidden units to random values 
uniformly distributed between 0.01 and 0.99, initializing the state of the environment, setting 
the relevant goal and state input unit(s), and then cycling through actions until either one 
hundred actions were attempted or the say-done action was selected. Sequences thus 
generated were scored as correct if they both ended with the say-done action and resulted in a 
state in which the initial goal was achieved. 
In order to explore the effects of different levels of guidance, each trained network was tested 
in this way for each of three varieties of goal feedback, namely undirected (i.e., with goal 
input units set to zero after the initial step), self-directed (i.e., with goal input on each cycle 
set to the goal output from the previous cycle), and SS-directed (i.e., with goal input set to the 
correct values to guide behavior on a step-by-step basis). In order to establish mean 
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performance of the model across different values for initial weights this procedure was 
repeated for 50 different networks at each level of training. 
Results 
The graphs in Figure 2 show, for each level of training, the mean percentage of correct trials 
for each level of goal and with the three different forms of goal feedback. Consider first the 
case of undirected feedback (red line). After 5000 epochs of training the GC model with 
undirected feedback is able to generate correct sequences for low-level goals on 
approximately 85% of trials. Performance is slightly better on mid-level goals, but drops to 
50% on high-level goals. With further training, performance with undirected goal feedback 
improves such that by 10,000 epochs the GC model performs near ceiling on low-level and 
middle-level goals and at 75% for high-level goals. With further training this increases to 
95% by 40,000 epochs. Performance with self-directed goal feedback (blue line) follows a 
similar pattern, though initial learning is faster and later learning is slower. When goal inputs 
are set to reflect the current goals and subgoals on a step-by-step basis (SS-directed; green 
line), the GC model performs even better, such that after only 5,000 epochs of training, it is 
able to correctly generate sequences on 85% of trials for low-level goals and over 95% of 
trials on mid-level and high-level goals. After 10,000 epochs the model performs near ceiling 
for all goal levels. Although not shown in the figure, performance on high-level goals in the 
undirected and self-directed conditions continues to improve with training, such that after 
100,000 epochs, models are correct on 99% of undirected trials and 92% self-directed trials. 
Discussion 
Simulation 1 demonstrates that the GC model is able to learn goal-directed sequences at all 
three levels, and moreover that it is able to generate such sequences either with goal input on 
just the first step (as in undirected mode), or with self-generated goal input on all steps (as in 
self-directed mode). The model is thus able to learn to use goal-input when it is present. This 
is demonstrated most clearly by the model’s behavior in the SS-directed condition, when goal 
inputs are set to reflect the current goals and subgoals on a step-by-step basis. The guidance 
provided by the goal input units in this condition parallels that provided by supervisory 
control in deliberate or willed control of behavior, and these simulations demonstrate that 
once the model has acquired action sequences for low-level goals (after relatively little 
learning – 5000 epochs) it is possible to guide the model to perform complex action 
sequences corresponding to high-level goals. 
The simulation also demonstrates how the model accounts for four of the eight characteristics 
of the control of sequential action highlighted in the introduction. First, that action may be 
Figure 2: Mean percentage of correct trials for sequences corresponding to each goal 
level and with each form of feedback at four points in training. Error bars show standard 
error over 50 trained networks. 
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controlled at multiple levels (characteristic 4) is demonstrated by the performance of the 
model in SS-directed mode (Figure 2, green lines, all graphs) – with goal inputs set in this 
way the model performs near ceiling for low-, mid- and high-level goals. Second, that routine 
action requires minimal attentional control (characteristic 6) is shown by the near ceiling 
performance of the model for low- and mid-level goals in undirected mode after 10,000 
epochs (when action sequences pertaining to the goals may be considered to be reutilized), 
and by the fact that for high-level goals performance approaches ceiling with further training 
(Figure 2, red lines, right-most graphs). Third, that learning reduces the need for attentional 
control (characteristic 7) is demonstrated by the increasing proportion of correct trials 
achieved in undirected mode with training (Figure 2, the red lines being higher on graphs 
towards the right than on graphs towards the left). Finally, that attentional control may initiate 
learned action sequences (characteristic 8) is demonstrated by the fully trained model’s ability 
to correctly perform action sequences for all levels of goal without feedback (i.e., Figure 2, 
the red line in the right-most graph). 
None of the above observations relate to the operation of the GC model in self-directed mode 
(i.e., Figure 2, blue lines). The difference between performance in self-directed and SS-
directed modes can be viewed as a measure of the model’s error – the error between the 
model’s prediction of the next goal (which is fed back) and the actual next goal (as would be 
supplied by the supervisory system). For low-level and intermediate-level goals the GC model 
functions well in self-directed mode. It is only for high-level goals were self-directed mode is 
not effective. Closer examination of processing in these cases reveals that the model’s 
performance is compromised by goal feedback that is insufficiently decisive. For example, in 
coffee making it is possible either to add sugar or cream after adding the grinds.  The model 
therefore learns to associate both subgoals at strength 0.5 with completion of adding grinds, 
rather than either subgoal at strength 1.0.  
Simulation 2: Intentional Control 
One key motivation for the goal circuit is the desire to provide a mechanism whereby 
deliberate control can over-ride a learned action sequence. This is the scenario explored in 
Simulation 2. Specifically, consider the situation where one wishes to prepare a “non-routine” 
beverage, such as a cup of tea without sugar, or a cup of coffee with two sugars. Botvinick 
and Plaut (2004) considered precisely this scenario, and demonstrated that their original SRN 
could, with the addition of a further instruction unit, be trained to prepare coffee with either 
one spoonful or two spoonsful of sugar. Cooper and Shallice (2006) criticized the training 
required by the SRN for this modified task. Essentially the SRN had to be trained from 
scratch on the two variants of coffee-making – there was no transfer of learning from one task 
to the other and no possibility of instructing the original model, once it had learned to make 
coffee with one spoonful of sugar, to add a second spoonful. Cooper and Shallice instead 
argued that this variant of coffee making was likely to involve recruitment of the standard 
coffee-making routine, but with mechanisms for the support of non-routine behavior being 
deployed to repeat the “adding-sugar” subroutine at an appropriate point in time (i.e., 
mechanisms associated with the supervisory system). The GC model provides the means of 
operationalizing this proposal. 
Method 
The model was trained with the same parameter settings and goal specifications as in 
simulation 1. Five levels of training were considered (2,500, 5,000, 10,000, 20,000 and 
40,000 epochs), and 50 networks were trained at each level, yielding a total of 250 trained 
networks. 
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Each trained network was tested on each of eight goals: the original tea-making and coffee-
making goals from the training set, the goals of tea without sugar, tea with cream, and tea 
with two sugars, and the goals of coffee without sugar, coffee without cream, and coffee with 
two sugars. On each step during testing, goal input units were set to values that an assumed 
supervisory system would provide. For example, when the goal was to make tea without 
sugar, the goal units for the “drink” subgoal were activated immediately after the tea had been 
steeped (when during training steeping the tea was followed by “add sugar”). Each trained 
network was tested 100 times on each of the eight goals, yielding a mean accuracy for that 
level of training and that goal.  
Note that in both training and testing, the effect of the fixate-sugar action was dependent upon 
the number of available sugar sources. In particular, if the sugar packet was used to add the 
first measure of sugar, then the packet would become empty and any subsequent attempt to 
fixate-sugar would result in fixation resting on the sugar bowl. 
Results 
Figure 3 shows the mean percentage of correct trials for each goal at each level of training. 
Unsurprisingly, the model performs almost perfectly at the routine “tea” goal and nearly as 
well at the routine “coffee” goal, even with relatively little training. This re-iterates the result 
shown in Figure 2 (green lines), of good performance under control from the supervisory 
system. The more interesting results arise from the novel goals. When instructed to prepare 
coffee without cream or without sugar, the GC model performs almost flawlessly, despite 
having never been trained to generate either sequence. The situation when making tea appears 
less satisfactory, where accuracy when skipping the sugaring subroutine or adding a creaming 
subroutine ranges from 70% to 80% after moderate training, but fails to increase with more 
extensive training. It is, however, sequences involving the addition of sugar twice that are 
most problematic. Here, while accuracy is greater for tea making than coffee making, in 
neither case does it reliably exceed 40%. Moreover, the situation again fails to improve with 
more extensive training. While levels of 40% to 80% accuracy are far from perfect, they are 
also well above the zero baseline one would expect if supervisory guidance was not possible. 
Discussion 
We begin with consideration of the major trends in the network’s behavior, and in particular 
the slightly inferior performance on standard coffee making compared to standard tea making. 
The failure of the trained network to flawlessly generate an appropriate sequence for standard 
coffee making on each trial contrasts with the near perfect performance of the trained network 
Figure 3: Mean percentage of correct trials for each goal level and with each form of 
feedback at four points in training with two levels of hidden unit noise (upper panel: noise 
s.d. = 0.10; lower panel: noise s.d. = 0.20). Note that in comparison to Figure 2 the range 
of the vertical axis has been increased. 
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on standard tea making. Failures in coffee making are due to a tendency to occasionally omit 
the sugar or cream subroutines. This tendency is a result of the presence of the two variants of 
coffee making within the training regime – with cream and then sugar or with sugar and then 
cream. Even with substantial training, the network occasionally conflates these sequences, 
resulting in either sugaring or creaming being omitted. The complementary aspect of this is 
that it is relatively easy to guide the network when making coffee into deliberate omission of 
either subsequence, as when making coffee without sugar or without cream. That these are 
indeed complementary phenomena is demonstrated by the fact that the reverse pattern is 
shown with tea making, where during training there is no variation in the order of the 
subroutines. Here, we see almost flawless performance of the basic routine but relatively 
frequent errors when the network is guided to make tea without sugar or with cream. 
When two sugars are required, two factors interact to limit the effectiveness of guidance from 
the supervisory system. First, recall that each sugaring subroutine begins with a fixate-sugar 
instruction, and this instruction may result in fixation moving to either the sugar bowl or (if it 
is not empty) the sugar packet. On some trials, both fixate-sugar instructions at the beginning 
of each sugaring sequence will result in fixation on the sugar bowl. In these situations the 
model as trained will fail, simply because the basic sugaring subroutine assumes, when using 
the sugar bowl, that the sugar bowl is closed. Yet that subroutine removes the sugar bowl’s lid 
and does not replace it. The second attempt at sugaring will therefore fail, with an attempt to 
remove the lid from the open sugar bowl. The second factor depends on the overall task. If the 
task is tea making with two sugars, guidance from the supervisory system must overcome the 
learned subsequence transition that, at least when preparing tea, sugaring is always followed 
immediately by drinking. This subsequence is encoded in the internal weights of the hidden 
layer. Since it is highly routine in the context of tea making it is hard to over-ride through 
deliberate control. If the task is coffee making with two sugars, the situation is similar if the 
supervisory system chooses to attempt sugaring twice in succession (either before or after 
adding cream). Only if the supervisory system chooses to perform the subsequences in the 
order sugaring – creaming – sugaring will the transition probabilities between subsequences 
be consistent with the training set, and only then (and when different sources of sugar are 
chosen) is the network likely to be successful.3 
These simulations therefore again demonstrate that the GC model satisfies characteristics 4 
and 8 of the control of sequential action, namely that action may be controlled at multiple 
levels and that attentional control may initiate and/or override learned action sequences. The 
failure of the model, however, to perform perfectly on novel variations of the tea-making and 
coffee-making tasks may appear to be a cause for concern: phenomenologically, if one attends 
to a task one can direct action at will. There are at least two plausible responses to this 
concern. First, deliberate direction of the GC model is more successful when attempting to 
perform a novel variant of a goal-directed sequence that was itself variable during training. 
Extending the training set with more variants of tea-making or with other beverage 
preparation tasks which share subroutines of tea-making and coffee-making is therefore likely 
to result in a system that is more easily directed away from a single routine. (This is 
essentially an extension of an argument proposed by Botvinick & Plaut, 2006.) There is a 
trade-off, however, and such a network is likely to require substantially more training in order 
to acquire routines in the first place. Second, it may be that greater control from the deliberate 
route is required. This would seem to require an alternative architecture in which each action 
results from the network settling to a stable state (i.e., an attractor state), and where deliberate 
                                                
3 This has been confirmed with additional simulations, where this constraint, plus the training regime described 
in Simulation 3, led to correct performance of preparation of coffee with two sugars in over 95% of attempts. 
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control can influence that settling. The interactive activation network model of Cooper and 
Shallice (2000) is effectively a localist implementation of such an architecture. 
Simulation 3: Environmental Variability 
A significant limitation of the GC model as described thus far is that in order to complete any 
sequence – whether it be routine or novel – it is necessary for the initial state of the world to 
match the state assumed in the network’s training regime. Thus, and as discussed above, 
while the model is trained to add sugar from either a packet or a closed sugar bowl, if it 
attempts to use the sugar bowl but the lid of the sugar bowl has already been removed (e.g., 
because it was not put in place by the previous user, or if the GC model is attempting to add 
sugar twice from the same bowl) then the model will fail in its attempt to add sugar. More 
generally, in real life behavioral flexibility demands that subroutines can be executed from a 
range of initial states. Consider the case of buttering toast. Normally one might begin this 
routine by fixating upon and picking up a butter knife, but if one is holding a knife (e.g., 
because one has just finished buttering another slice of toast), then these initial actions can 
and should be omitted. On the other hand if one is holding some other implement (e.g., a 
spoon) then it is necessary first to put down the spoon before fixating upon and picking up the 
butter knife. Simulation 3 demonstrates that with a generalized training regime the GC model 
is capable of this kind of behavioral flexibility. 
Method 
The model was trained with the same parameter settings and goal specifications as in 
Simulation 1. Again as in Simulation 1, 50 networks were trained in this manner for each of 
five levels of training, ranging from 2,500 epochs to 40,000 epochs. In contrast to earlier 
simulations, the initial state of the world was not fixed. Instead, on only 1 in 8 training trials 
was the network initially fixated on nothing. On the remaining trails it was initialized with 
fixation on one of the seven objects in the simulated world, each with equal probability. 
Similarly, on only 1 in 8 training trials was the network initially holding nothing. Again, on 
the remaining trials it was initialized to be holding one of the seven objects from the 
simulated world, each with equal probability. Finally, the four containers (coffee packet, 
sugar packet, sugar bowl, cream carton) were closed in 50% of trials and open in 50% of 
trials. All of these variable attributes of the initial state were set independently, meaning that 
there were 1024 possible initial states. Each epoch still involved one trial for each of the 18 
training goals. Note though that on each trial (for both training and testing) the initial state 
was set randomly, so with 2,500 epochs it is likely that some of the 1024 possible initial states 
were never confronted, while even with 40,000 epochs, one would anticipate each initial state 
to occur only about 40 times during the entire training regime.  
In order to evaluate the effect of this more general training on performance in general and 
guided novel behavior in particular, the network was tested as in Simulation 2. Thus, each 
trained network was tested with goal inputs set by an assumed supervisory system on tea-
making, coffee-making, and each of the six novel goals. As in earlier simulations, each 
trained network was tested on each goal 100 times, yielding a mean accuracy for that level of 
training and that goal.  
Results 
Figure 4 shows the mean accuracy of the GC model under this revised training regime for 
each of the eight test goals. In comparison to Figure 3, accuracy is lower for the same level of 
training. This is to be expected given the variability in the initial state of the world. Note 
though that with sufficient training (40,000 epochs) performance for most goals is still very 
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good. The key difference from Figure 3, however, is the greatly improved accuracy when 
preparing coffee with two sugars. Here, the model with supervisory-system guidance correctly 
performs the task on approximately 75% of trials. This contrasts with performance at the 25% 
level in Simulation 2. 
Discussion 
Great flexibility in action selection is required in order to correctly perform goal-directed 
action sequences in an uncertain or unpredictable world. For example, in order to achieve 
even a low-level goal of “getting” (i.e., picking up) a specified object, action selection must 
be sensitive to whether the object is already held, and if not, to whether the hands are free and 
to where fixation is directed. Thus, the goal may require anything between zero and three 
actions to achieve, depending on the state of the environment. Simulation 3 demonstrates that 
if trained appropriately the GC model can exhibit this flexibility, both at the lowest level of 
goals and at higher levels. In terms of the characteristics of the introduction, the simulation 
demonstrates that the GC model meets characteristic 3: that not all actions within a sequence 
are equal – the model can learn to include enabling actions when they are necessary but leave 
them out when they are not.  
This characteristic is of course dependent upon having appropriate training – the model can 
only cope with variation in the environment if it has been exposed to similar variation during 
training. Note though that training on variant environments is not exhaustive. The training 
regime ensures that the model encounters a range of environments during the training phase, 
but it does not systematically ensure that each and every possible arrangement of objects is 
presented multiple times (or even once) for each and every goal.  
General Discussion 
We have argued that current psychological models of routine sequential action fail to provide 
a mechanistic account of the acquisition of flexible control, and presented the Goal Circuit 
model as a hybrid approach that resolves key difficulties related to this issue. We see the 
control of routine sequential action as an ability in the sense of Cassimatis et al. (2008), i.e., 
as a higher-order cognitive phenomenon exhibited by humans that must be explained. Thus, 
our approach has been to demonstrate how general and ubiquitous characteristics of routine 
sequential action emerge from the GC model. The model assumes two basic properties or 
characteristics of sequential action – that it is purposive and hierarchical – and exhibits six 
other characteristics enumerated in the introduction. It augments the model of Botvinick and 
Plaut (2004) in several important ways, most notably by providing the core SRN with an 
interface to the hypothesized SS. The interface enables routines at different levels to be 
accessed, in a fashion consistent with the interactive activation model of Cooper and Shallice 
Figure 4: Mean percentage of correct trials for trained and novel goals at five points in 
training and with a variable initial state of the world (cf. Figure 4).  
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(2000), thus allowing for flexible control at the level of already acquired routines (e.g., online 
modifications, error correction and/or reordering of known subsequences). We hold this 
extension to be important because without it only behavior that was entirely routinized and 
evoked by external instruction or by object affordances could be captured. Our model thus 
implements the interplay between all three possible influences within the CS/SS complex: 
bottom-up triggering from the environment, ordering constraints from ‘horizontal threads’ 
and, depending on the control mode, additional top-down influences (‘vertical threads’) from 
the supervisory system. Importantly, the exact relation between these three possible influences 
is dependent on both experience and local task complexity.  
Multiple routes and their interaction in the selection of action 
As noted earlier, the GC model has three paths that combine to produce action selection. The 
direct path (cf. Figure 1a), mapping from perceptual input to action, may be seen as providing 
a baseline distribution of plausible actions given the current perceptual input but ignoring any 
contextual information. On its own, the direct pathway tends to produce a broad and non-
specific distribution of possible actions to select at each instant, reflecting the fact that, as in 
real life, many actions are typically possible at any time, and situations in which one and only 
one action is physically possible are rare. The direct pathway allows some generalization – 
actions that are frequent in similar perceptual contexts will receive some excitation – but if an 
action has never been selected in the current perceptual context, or any similar perceptual 
context, then it will receive little or no excitation from this route. This tends to rule out an 
enormous number of possible successor actions (e.g., the physically impossible ones, such as 
attempting to tear open the sugar bowl, or trying to put something down when nothing is 
being held) and provides a useful bias towards possible and frequent actions in cases where 
the more sophisticated pathways fail (e.g., in error recovery or when the environment is 
different from expected, as has been shown with the open sugar bowl above in Simulation 3). 
To return to our analogy from the introduction: no matter how novel the path and how 
confused the rider, it will be hard to convince the horse to turn left when there is a tree 
standing in the way – possible paths are always restricted to physically valid choices. The 
direct pathway thus serves to suppress impossible actions and biases the basic level system 
towards the most likely action given the current perceptual input, reflecting frequency and, if 
training is assumed to be continuous, recency effects within the system’s experience.  
The recurrent inputs from the context units (cf. Figure 1b), in contrast, add a bias towards 
those successor actions that are plausible at this point when also taking implicit contextual 
information into account. In the GC model this implicit contextual information might 
comprise temporal context information in terms of prior states – what has been seen and done 
before – and also internalized goals – which goals have been active before. As both of these 
aspects are represented within the shared hidden layer, and previous hidden layer activation is 
used as implicit context, they both may have an influence on the selection of the current 
action. Adding this implicit context information will usually lead to a further restriction on the 
set of possible successor actions (see Figure 5). Actions that are physically possible, but 
inappropriate given this implicit context, can be ruled out. How correct and specific the 
recurrent contribution is depends on the salience of the implicit context information. It is this 
salience that increases with experience and as shown in simulation 1 (undirected mode) it is 
sufficient to guide performance in a moderately complex, but well learned task. 
The salience of the implicit context information and thus the quality of the basic system’s 
choice at each point in a sequence depends on several factors such as experience, distance of 
relevant dependencies, and neighborhood (i.e., number and frequency of locally similar 
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congruent or incongruent sequences). For those transitions in a sequence where the above-
mentioned factors go in an unfavorable direction – novel, long, structurally complex 
sequences with many ‘false friends’ – the basic system (CS) might not be able to provide an 
unambiguous choice. It is in these cases that the goal circuit (cf. Figure 1c) can exert a 
decisive influence by further narrowing down the choice, and possibly disposing of the 
remaining ambiguity. 
Figure 5 illustrates how the three influences combine. The general picture is one of a 
hierarchy of pathways that try to enforce an increasingly constrained set of transitions. 
Transitions advocated by higher-level pathways are a subset of the transitions that a lower 
level pathway proposes, because higher-level pathways take more information into account 
and thus produce less ambiguous choices of action. The difference in the distribution of 
transitions is most notable in cases where more information helps most (see Figure 5b), i.e., 
when temporal context has to be taken into account and/or when the information in the 
implicit context layer is not (yet) sufficiently salient. The choice implemented by the different 
pathways can be very similar, though, in situations where selection of the correct action is not 
much helped by additional context information or where the basic system has already 
internalized the explicit goal information (see Figure 6a). Whether explicit goals are activated 
or not does not make much of a difference in these latter (routine) situations – the basic (CS) 
system is sufficient or, as Wood and Neal (2007, p. 853) put it: “When habits and goals 
dictate the same response, […] goals in effect are rendered epiphenomena”. Importantly, the 
relationship between the influences of the different pathways may change (a) for every step in 
a sequence and (b) through time as the experience of the network changes. The latter allows 
for a gradual transition of the responsibility for action selection from better informed 
pathways to less informed ones, where steps within invariant, tightly integrated subsequences 
become routinized first while the more informationally complex steps (such as branching 
points) may rely on the additional influence of SS for longer. 
Figure 5: Activation that possible successor actions may receive from the different 
pathways in a hypothetical routine (Figure 6a, left) and non-routine (Figure 6b, right) 
situation. The activation from the direct pathway is shown in bars with a white fill, the 
contribution of the implicit context is depicted in gray, while the black bars stand for the 
bias from explicit goal input. In the routine case, all sources of activation support the same 
action (action B), while in the non-routine case multiple actions are supported by both the 
direct pathway and the context, but only one (again action B) is supported by the explicit 
goal input. 
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This proposed combination of influences contrasts with the uncertainty-based controller of 
Daw et al. (2005) that, they argue, selects between the outputs of the cached (i.e. habit-based) 
and tree-search (i.e. goal-based) systems. Yet the general architecture of the GC model 
mirrors ideas from research in both cognitive neuroscience and artificial intelligence. With 
regard to the former, Koechlin, Ody and Kouneiher (2003) have proposed that the neural 
architecture of cognitive control comprises a set of increasingly frontal processes that control 
behavior with respect “to stimuli, the present perceptual context, and the temporal episode in 
which stimuli occur” (Koechlin et al., 2003, p. 1181), with these processes being arranged 
along the lateral surface of the prefrontal cortex. With regard to the latter, architectures such 
as Brooks’ subsumption architecture (see Brooks, 1991) conceive of cognition as a hierarchy 
of layers with increasingly complex functionality, with higher levels modulating lower levels. 
Glasspool (2005) argues that there is a close correspondence between the three levels 
emerging from convergent research in artificial intelligence, on the one hand, and from 
cognitive neuroscience on the other. The three different pathways in our model fit well with 
the levels generally distinguished in both disciplines. 
Learning and progressive routinization 
The existence of multiple routes combined with learning mechanisms within the GC 
architecture work together to produce redundant representations for the control of routine 
tasks. The function of goal units, which represent control information in the SS in localist 
terms, is to bias the lower level system towards task-appropriate actions. This bias is most 
critical at subtask boundaries when environmental cues provide poor predictors of subsequent 
actions. Through learning, this control information must become re-represented as a 
distributed representation within the model’s context layer (i.e., within CS). While we have 
adopted standard back-propagation through time (BPTT) in the current implementation, we 
see learning as a bottom-up process, with sequences related to lower-level goals being 
acquired before those for higher-level goals. We refer to this process as “progressive 
routinization”. We therefore have no strong commitment to the use of BPTT (or the tens of 
thousands of epochs of training that BPTT requires), and see it as an implementation detail in 
the sense of Cooper et al. (1996) – it is one of conceivably many learning algorithms that 
might show progressive routinization.  
Progressive routinization, or assembling novel sequences from existing behavioral patterns 
and subsequently routinizing such novel behaviors, presupposes that the constituent behaviors 
and the supervisory system’s ability to access them are already in place. At least at the 
beginning of one’s life, however, this is unlikely to be the case. Thus, while progressive 
routinization might be the norm for the kind of everyday activities typically considered in 
empirical research on routine action, a bottom-up approach for the acquisition of at least the 
basic building blocks of behavior is still needed. Hierarchical reinforcement learning (see 
Botvinick, Niv & Barto, 2009) may provide a framework for combining these two aspects of 
learning. Hierarchical reinforcement learning is an augmented form of standard reinforcement 
learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998), which is itself an effective method of learning goal-directed 
behaviors and for which there is substantial neurophysiological support (e.g., Dickinson & 
Balleine, 2002; Daw et al., 2005). Hierarchical reinforcement learning combines exploration 
(of the space of possible actions) and exploitation (of acquired action/reward contingencies) 
with the kind of hierarchical structure that we have argued characterizes the action domain 
(characteristic 2 from above). In previous work with the IAN model we have shown that 
standard reinforcement learning can be used to acquire associations between the state of the 
environment and appropriate (single) actions (Cooper & Glasspool, 2001). We have also 
shown, within an SRN architecture similar to that of Botvinick and Plaut (2004), that so-
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called temporal difference reinforcement learning can be used to acquire short goal-directed 
action sequences within a restricted domain (Ruh, Cooper & Mareschal, 2005). However, 
temporal difference reinforcement learning did not scale well to the acquisition of longer 
sequences in more complex domains. Hierarchical reinforcement learning appears to be one 
way of resolving this scaling problem.4 
On the role of goal input units 
The concept of a goal has a long and checkered history within psychology. It was 
unfashionable during the behaviorist era, and served as a key ingredient in the cognitive 
revolution (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960). The concept remains central to many 
contemporary models of both routine sequential behavior and skill acquisition (e.g., Fu & 
Anderson, 2006; Taatgen et al., 2008; Trafton, et al., 2011). In sequential action goals serve 
two functions. First, it is an action sequence’s goal which makes the actions within the 
sequence cohere and allows them to be described as a unit (as in the case of the add sugar 
goal). Second, goals allow action sequences to be assembled in constructive (i.e., generative) 
ways. Thus, the beverage sweetening sequence should only be included in a larger beverage 
preparation sequence if that beverage requires sweetening, but sweetening may also be 
achieved by other means (e.g., by using an artificial sweetener), or it may be modified if extra 
sweetener is required, or it may be suppressed from a routine if one is attempting to reduce 
the sugar in one’s diet (as in Simulation 3; See Cooper & Shallice, 2006, and Duncan, 1986, 
for additional discussion). 
The goal units, when active, bias the basic level network towards the transitions that lead to 
reaching this goal, thus enforcing a specific “policy” (i.e., a specific set of input-action 
associations). Goals at different levels are redundant when the policy of the lower level goal is 
included in the policy for the higher-level goal, e.g., as in the case of add sugar, which is 
included in make coffee. However, higher-level policies include a preference for what should 
be done after each lower level goal is achieved (e.g., if preparing coffee, then after sugar has 
been added cream should be added), while lower-level policies do not (e.g., if adding sugar to 
a beverage as a stand-alone procedure, then no specific actions should follow once adding 
sugar is complete).  
As in other models where goals are explicitly represented (e.g., Taatgen et al., 2008; Trafton 
et al., 2011), goal units also give the GC model a form of compositionality, in the sense that 
an action sequence related to a subgoal (e.g., add sugar) can be invoked (and correctly 
performed) in different contexts by activating the appropriate goal units. While 
compositionality might appear at odds with the parallel distributed processing substrate of the 
model, Plaut and McClelland (1993) have demonstrated in a model of reading that, if the 
domain is appropriately structured, gradient descent learning algorithms such as back-
propagation through time yield so-called “componential attractors” – internal representations 
that reflect the compositional structure of the domain. A key difference between training of 
the GC model and that of Botvinick and Plaut’s (2004) SRN is that the GC training set 
posseses compositional structure, and while we are not committed to the precise details of the 
                                                
4 These reinforcement learning methods are all model-free methods, in that they rely only on positive or negative 
reinforcement at various points in time, with the network choosing on each step the action that has been 
reinforced most in the current context. We hold no strong commitment to model-free methods. Indeed, while 
action selection within the contention scheduling system is model-free, it may still be necessary to learn a model 
of the environment in order to predict feedback (see Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). In particular, an influential 
account of low-level motor control argues that errors are detected by a mismatch between predicted and actual 
feedback (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000), and there is no reason to suppose that similar systems would not 
operate at the contention scheduling level. 
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learning algorithm, this structure is reflected in its results. 
An alternative way of looking at the goal units is as a “habit-goal interface”. Wood and Neal 
(2007) identify several properties of the habit-goal interface, including: slowly accrued 
automaticity within the habit system, context sensitivity of habits, autonomy of strong habits, 
and several ways in which habits can influence goals and vice versa (e.g., goals can spur habit 
learning, habits can inform goals, and habits can interact with goals in guiding responses). 
Due to the flexible interplay of multiple routes the GC model addresses these properties in 
mechanistic terms. 
With practice (or training) the need for goal input within the model is reduced (see Simulation 
1). This is consistent with our own empirical findings. In a computerized version of a 
beverage preparation task, Ruh, Cooper and Mareschal (2010) demonstrated that participants 
were slower to select actions at subtask boundaries (so-called branching points) than at other 
points in the sequence, and that such selections were disproportionately affected when the 
task was performed in conjunction with an unrelated, attentionally demanding, secondary 
task. Importantly, however, interference with the secondary task was reduced with increasing 
practice. This was interpreted as a reflection of gradually decreasing demand for additional 
biasing from higher-level systems as the task became more well-learned or routinized (see 
also Ruh, 2007). 
Taatgen et al. (2008) argue for a slightly different view of goal input during skilled behavior. 
They found in a complex cognitive task (setting and modifying a route within the Boeing 777 
flight management system) that learning was faster, and supported better generalization, when 
instructions were given as sequences of preconditions / action pairs rather than as sequences 
of actions. The authors argue on the basis of this and related empirical and computational 
work for what they refer to as the minimal control principle, which requires that a “task 
representation should have a control structure that is as small as possible” (Taatgen et al., 
2008, p. 550). Taatgen et al.’s concern in developing this principle was to maximize 
perceptual control without compromising action selection. While we concur on the utility of 
perceptual input, the GC model supports redundancy of representation, as described above 
and illustrated in Figure 5. A key consequence of this redundancy is that goal input can, at 
any time, over-ride acquired condition / action contingencies.  
The Goal Circuit and the Supervisory System 
We have attempted to capture how a hypothesized supervisory system could interface with a 
distributed contention scheduling system, rather than the detailed workings of the supervisory 
system itself. In testing the model we made use of simple ways to connect the predicted future 
goals to the goal input in the following step (the goal circuit), such as recirculating the 
predicted goals into the goal input in order to guide action selection at the next step, or 
simulating the functionality of the supervisory system by specifying the correct goal inputs at 
each step. Independently of the exact implementation of its functionality, however, the goal 
circuit facilitates the supervisory system’s task in three ways:  
1. It provides the supervisory system with a choice of possible goals to reach from the 
current state. This pre-selection rules out a great many other goals that the supervisory 
system does not have to worry about. 
2. It gives an indication of whether it is necessary for the supervisory system to become 
involved (through output conflict or uncertainty). This is important because even in a 
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poorly learned task it is likely that there will be subsequences that are known from other 
contexts and that can be carried out without close supervision.  
3. It functions through the activation of goal units, not individual actions, mirroring the 
biasing function of the supervisory system on the contention scheduling system within 
Norman and Shallice’s (1986) Dual Systems framework. 
This last point, that the goal circuit functions through activation of goals, supports flexibility 
in recovering from minor slips or in situations where there are many different ways to reach a 
specific goal (see also Taatgen et al., 2008). In addition it is consistent with empirical 
evidence and recent theoretical developments that attach central importance to the notion of 
goals as the representational format used by higher level executive systems for the purpose of 
overseeing, integrating and manipulating information from very dissimilar lower level 
functions (Braver & Cohen, 2000; Hommel, 2003; see Miller & Cohen, 2001, for an 
overview) and for managing the continuity of behavior over different time scales (Koechlin et 
al., 2003).  
We have not attempted to model the detailed functioning of the supervisory system – the 
system that is assumed to be critical to the generation and regulation of all non-routine 
behavior. While some authors have suggested that the supervisory system is a homunculus 
with little explanatory power (e.g., Dennett, 1998), a series of papers by Shallice and 
colleagues (Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Shallice, 2002; Shallice et al., 2008; Shallice & 
Cooper, 2011) has attempted to fractionate the supervisory system into component processes 
such as goal generation, strategy generation, and monitoring and checking. These processes 
are hypothesized to work together in the control of complex cognition (such as when playing 
chess or planning a holiday), drawing on other non-central systems (e.g., language systems 
and episodic memory: see Shallice & Cooper, 2011) and interfacing with the contention 
scheduling system in the generation of behavior. However, with the possible exception of 
monitoring and checking, supervisory processes are not involved in routine sequential action, 
and it is for this reason that we have not attempted to model supervisory system processes 
here.  
We conceive of the different control modes employed to test the GC model as a continuum 
that ranges from no contribution of the supervisory system to the supervisory system being 
fully involved in the current action selection. While fully routinized behavior involves a 
lengthy sequence of actions that may be activated appropriately in the absence of supervisory 
control, we suggest that the vast majority of naturalistic tasks are likely to involve a mixture 
of stretches of actions that are executed on ‘autopilot’, interspersed with occasional biasing 
input from the higher level control system. This view, coupled with the assumption that the 
supervisory system is a frontal system while contention scheduling draws upon parietal and 
sub-cortical structures (Shallice & Cooper, 2011), is also consistent with the 
neuropsychological evidence which suggests that impairments in routine behavior can follow 
both frontal and parietal lobe brain injury (Luria, 1966; Schwartz et al., 1991, 1998). 
Conclusion 
We have argued for eight simple characteristics of routine sequential action and presented a 
model of action control that captures these properties, either by design (characteristics 1 and 
2) or as a consequence of that design (characteristics 3 to 8). The model goes beyond its 
predecessors by providing a computationally explicit account of the detailed interplay 
between all three influences identified in Norman and Shallice’s (1986) dual-systems 
framework (bottom-up triggering, horizontal sequencing threads, and top-down control), thus 
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addressing the non-trivial problem of interfacing a basic habit or routine system with a higher 
level supervisory or goal system (see also Wood & Neal, 2007). It has been demonstrated that 
our extended SRN model is able to perform more or less routinized action sequences in a 
flexible, goal directed manner. While the model takes minor variations in the state of the 
environment in its stride, it also has the means to recover following error or to perform novel 
combinations of known subtasks by using its explicit goal representations. Moreover, the GC 
model is able to accommodate progressive hierarchical routinization through redundant 
encoding of (sub)task context within explicit goal and implicit context units. The model has 
the advantage over other existing models of acquiring this functionality in a psychologically 
plausible way (i.e., with shorter sequences first, with sequences associated with goals, and 
initially with tight control) and ending up with a functional interface through which an 
executive system may be used to guide the model’s behavior by setting intentions or goals. 
Our model thus provides a computationally explicit approach that addresses not only how the 
rider (SS) may control the horse, but also how the horse (CS) can acquire the ability to carry 
out complex hierarchical routine tasks autonomously.  
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